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ONE CRIME, MANY CONVICTED: DISSOCIATIVE
IDENTITY DISORDER AND THE EXCLUSION OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY IN STATE v. GREENE
Mary Eileen Crego
In State v. Greene, the Supreme Court of Washington held that expert testimony about
Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) was not admissible to support an insanity or diminishedcapacity defense. Even though the court acknowledged DID as a generally accepted medical
disorder, the court reasoned that such testimony would not be helpful to the trier of fact, as
required by Washington Evidence Rule (ER) 702, because the court has not established a
specific standard for determining the legal responsibility of a defendant with multiple
personalities. This Note argues that the Greene court had sufficient scientific evidence to
establish a legal standard to determine the culpability of a defendant with DID. This Note
further argues that expert testimony about DID would have been helpful to the jury under ER
702 and should have been admitted. Finally, this Note concludes that the Greene decision
denied the defendant his constitutional right, under both federal and state jurisprudence, to
present evidence in his defense.

On April 29, 1994, a therapist went to the apartment of one of her
patients.' When she arrived, a violent four-year-old boy named Tyrone
attacked her. William, the patient she had gone to see, was unconscious
during the assault and had no knowledge of Tyrone's actions. Under
normal circumstances, an American court would not convict William for
Tyrone's actions. But in this case, Tyrone and William inhabit the same
body. William Greene has Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID),2
commonly called Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD)? He is the host
of twenty-four different personalities, including Tyrone.
When individuals with DID, such as Greene, are accused of crimes,
courts face a variety of legal challenges. 4 Commentators and defendants
1. See State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 88-89,960 P.2d 984-85 (1998).
2. Dissociative Identity Disorder is a disorder in which multiple personalities inhabit one mind
and take recurrent control of a person's behavior. See American Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic &
StatisticalManualofMental Disorders477 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
3. Multiple Personality Disorder is the previous technical name of DID. See American Psychiatric
Assoc., Diagnostic& StatisticalManual of MentalDisorders269-73 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter
DSM-Ill]. Because two additional diagnostic criteria were added when MPD was renamed DID,
compare DSM-IV at 477 with DSM-III at 269-72, this Note will refer to defendants diagnosed
before 1994 as having MPD and those diagnosed after 1994 as having DID.
4. See generally Sarah K. Fields, Multiple PersonalityDisorderand the Legal System, 46 Wash.
U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 261, 261-262, 276-88 (1994); Sabra McDonald Owens, Diagnostic
Evidence Admissibility and the Multiple PersonalityDisorderDefense, 1 . Health Care L. & Pol'y
236,244 (1998).
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question whether defendants with DID are competent to stand trial,5
responsible for crimes,6 or fair recipients of punishment.' Defendants
with DID often claim that more than one fully developed personality
inhabits a single body and that one personality should not be punished
for the criminal actions of other personalities These defendants
frequently raise insanity or diminished-capacity defenses,9 forcing courts
into the challenging position of trying to evaluate the mental state of a
person who claims to have many distinct personalities residing in one
body.1°
The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Greene" recently
affirmed the kidnapping and indecent-liberties conviction of a defendant
with DID.' 2 The court decided that evidence of the defendant's DID,
including expert testimony, was not admissible because it would not help
the trier of fact resolve issues of insanity or diminished capacity. 3
Although the court agreed that DID is generally accepted within the
scientific community, it concluded that more scientific evidence about
how DID relates to criminal responsibility is necessary before DID
evidence would be helpful to a trier of fact and admissible under
Washington Evidence Rule (ER) 702.14

5. See Fields, supra note 4, at 280-81 (observing that amnesia between personalities could hinder
defendants' ability to assist counsel).
6. See id. at 275-76; Owens, supranote 4, at 244.
7. See Fields, supra note 4, at 276.
8. See Sabra McDonald Owens, The Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) Defense, 8 Md. J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 237, 237-38 (1997); Fields, supra note 4, at 276 (explaining that because all
personalities inhabit one body, either innocent personalities may be punished or guilty ones may go
free).
9. See Sabra M. Owens, Criminal Responsibility and Multiple PersonalityDefendants, Mental &
Physical Disability L. Rep. 133, 140-43 (1997) (noting that 55% of DID defendants enter insanity
plea); see, e.g., New Jersey v. Moore, 550 A.2d 117, 141 (N.J. 1988); State v. Greene, 92 Wash.
App. 80, 84,960 P.2d 980,982 (1998), rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
10. See Elyn R. Saks, Multiple PersonalityDisorderand Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. 383, 389 (1992) (observing that defendants with DID force legal system to confront issues of
personhood and character).
11. 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
12. See id. at 79, 984 P.2d at 1031-32.
13. See id.
14. See id.
Evidence Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony in Washington. See
State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244, 256, 922 P.2d 1304, 1313 (1996) (analyzing admissibility of
scientific evidence using ER 702 and Frye test); State v. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d 879, 886, 890-91,
846 P.2d 502, 504, 507 (1993) (same). ER 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
This Note argues that the Greene court erred by not admitting expert
testimony about the defendant's DID. Part I describes DID, the legal
standards for admitting scientific evidence, the insanity and diminishedcapacity defenses, and how DID evidence has been handled in previous
cases. Part II outlines the facts of State v. Greene and summarizes the
trial court, court of appeals, and Supreme Court of Washington opinions.
Part Im criticizes the supreme court's failure to establish a legal standard
for determining the culpability of DID defendants, explains why the
court should have admitted the evidence as helpful under ER 702, and
argues that the court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
present relevant evidence on his own behalf.
I.

DISSOCIATIVE IDENTITY DISORDER, ADMISSIBILITY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY, MENTAL-CAPACITY DEFENSES,
AND USE OF DID EVIDENCE IN PREVIOUS CASES

In the last three decades, courts have confronted an increasing number
of legal issues surrounding DID. 5 This section will first describe DID's
diagnostic criteria, symptoms, and terminology. Next, this section will
summarize the legal standards for admitting scientific evidence and
explain a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present evidence. Third,
this section will highlight the use of expert testimony to support insanity
and diminished-capacity defenses. Finally, this section will examine how
DID evidence has been handled in other jurisdictions and previous

Washington cases.
A.

DissociativeIdentity Disorder

A person suffering from Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) 16 may
have from two to hundreds of personalities inhabiting one body. 7 The
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise"
15. See Fields, supra note 4, at 265-266 n.27.

16. A dissociative disorder involves a break in the connection between memories or personality. It
can be as simple as daydreaming or as complex as DID. See Owens, supra note 8, at 240-41 (citing
DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 477). DID is one of five types of dissociative disorders recognized by the

American Psychiatric Institute. See id. The other four are dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue,
depersonalization disorder, and dissociative disorder not otherwise specified. See id. Although
symptoms corresponding to DID have been documented since 1646, the number of purported

multiple-personality cases and literature surrounding them has skyrocketed in the last 20 years. See
Owens, supra note 4, at 264-65; Saks, supra note 10, at 391.
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personalities frequently differ in age, race, gender, and emotional state, 8
and may also demonstrate different physical responses to stimuli and
score differently on psychological tests. 9 For example, MPD patient
Billy Mulligan "had a violent personality who spoke Serbo-Croat, a
teenaged personality who was an escape artist, and a helper personality
who spoke with an English accent.' '21 Personalities are often not aware of
the existence of other personalities or do not retain memories from the
times other personalities control the body.2 ' The characteristics of each
personality and the interaction between personalities is a complex
dynamic unique to each individual with DID.22
Psychiatrists use specialized terminology to describe DID patients.23
The entire person, including all personalities inhabiting the body, is
referred to as a "multiple., 24 "Host" personality refers to the personality
in control of the body the greatest amount of time.25 "Alter" describes

17. See Fields, supra note 4, at 264. The average number of personalities is eight. See Owens,
supra note 4, at 264. The DSM-IVspecifies four criteria for a diagnosis of DID:
A. The presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own
relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and
self).
B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person's
behavior.
C. Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be explained by
ordinary forgetfulness.
D. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., blackouts or
chaotic behavior during Alcohol Intoxication) or a general medical condition (e.g., complex
partial seizures).
DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 487.
18. See Fields, supra note 4, at 264.
19. See Saks, supra note 10, at 396-97 (stating that personalities "are often different handed,
wear glasses with different prescriptions, respond differently to medication, score differently on
psychological tests, and even respond differently on physiological measures like the Galvanic Skin
Response and [Electroencephalograms]").
20. Id. (citing Daniel Keyes, The Minds ofBilly Mulligan xv-xviii (1981)).
21. See Fields, supra note 4, at 263; Mark E. Hindley, Note, United States v. Denny-Shaffer and
Multiple Personality Disorder: "Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?", 1994 Utah L. Rev.
961,966.
22. See Owens, supra note 4, at 240.
23. See Richard P. Kluft, An Introduction to Multiple PersonalityDisorder, 14 Psychiatric Annals
19,23 (1984).
24. See id.
25. See id. (noting host is personality generally recognized by society as person).

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
other personalities who may emerge and control the body at different
times."
DID is strongly associated with childhood sexual abuse.27 Scientific
evidence suggests that DID emerges as a way to cope with childhood
abuse, neglect, or trauma.2" Unconsciously developing alter personalities

may serve as an escape from reality, a containment of traumatic
memories, an analgesic, or a detachment of the sense of self so the
trauma happens to someone else.29

The widespread agreement among mental-health professionals about
DID's symptoms, the near uniformity of its roots in childhood trauma,
and the positive response of patients to therapy3 0 all support the existence
of DID as a diagnosable and treatable mental disorder.3' Despite
questions raised by skeptics about the diagnosis of individual cases,32
DID's general acceptance rate among mental-health professionals is at
least eighty percent.33 When courts consider evidence of DID, they use

the rules established for admission of scientific evidence and expert
testimony.
B.

Rulesfor Admission ofScientific Evidence in Washington and Due
ProcessRamifications ofRefusal to Admit Evidence
Washington courts use a two-step process articulated in State v.

Cauthron34 to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence such as

26. See id
27. See Saks, supra note 10, at 394.
28. See id.at 394-95.
29. See Hindley, supra note 21, at 965 (citing Doris Bryant et al., The Family Inside: Working
with the Multiple 4 (1992)).
30. Treatment of DID often involves psychotherapy and hypnosis. The goal of the therapy is
usually to reintegrate all personality states to form a cohesive whole. See Saks, supra note 10, at
398-99.
31. Seeid. at 401-02.
32. See id at 400-01 (noting that some who are skeptical of disorder believe it can be
consciously simulated, inadvertently created under hypnosis, or unconsciously adopted by patients to
please their therapists).
33. See State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 72, 984 P.2d 1024, 1028 (1999) (noting both State and
defense experts agree at least 80% of psychiatrists accept disorders included in DSM-IV including
DID). Inclusion in the DSM-IV reflects "a consensus of current formulations of evolving
knowledge" in the mental-health field. DSM-1V, supra note 2, at xxvii.
34. 120 wash. 2d 879, 849 P.2d 502(1993).
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psychological theories and expert testimony.35 First, they use the Frye
test36 to determine the general acceptance and reliability of the scientific
theory or principle.37 Second, courts evaluate the relevance of the
evidence under ER 702 and 401" to determine if the expert is qualified
and the information would be helpful to the jury.39 In addition, courts
must also consider the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present
evidence.40
1.

Scientific Evidence Must Pass the Frye Test and Be Relevant

As applied in Washington, the Frye test requires two elements. First,
courts determine if the scientific theory or principle upon which the
evidence is based has gained general scientific acceptance. 4 Second,
courts decide whether there are generally accepted methods of applying
the theory or principle in a manner capable of producing reliable
results.42 To make both these determinations, Washington courts look to
literature on the subject and the opinions of other jurisdictions.4 3 By
making admissibility of scientific evidence contingent on its acceptance
by the scientific community, courts recognize that "judges do not have
the expertise required to decide whether a challenged scientific theory is
correct."
35. See id. at 886, 889-90, 846 P.2d at 505, 507; see also State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 232,
850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993).
36. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding novel scientific evidence
inadmissible unless generally accepted by relevant scientific community). The U.S. Supreme Court
has ruled that general acceptance is not required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). The Supreme Court of Washington has
specifically declined to apply the Court's interpretation to Washington Rule of Evidence 702. See
State v. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d 244,259,922 P.2d 1304, 1314 (1996).
37. See Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d at 255-56, 922 P.2d at 1312-13.
38. Washington Rule of Evidence 401 states: "Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Wash. R. Evid. 401. Because
the Greene court's analysis was confined to ER 702, this Note does not address ER 401.
39. See ER 401; Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 890-91, 846 P.2d at 507.
40. See State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498,523,963 P.2d 843, 856 (1998).
41. See Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d at 255-56, 922 P.2d at 1312-13.
42. See State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 70, 984 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1999).
43. See Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d at 256-57, 922 P.2d at 1312-13; Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at
888, 846 P.2d at 506.
44. Copeland, 130 Wash. 2d at 255, 922 P.2d at 1312 (citing Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 887, 846
P.2d at 505-06).

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
If the scientific evidence passes the general-acceptance test, courts
then consider whether it will assist the trier of fact as required by ER
702.' Scientific evidence is considered helpful to the trier of fact if it is
relevant. 6 The Supreme Court of Washington has previously decided
that evidence is considered relevant under ER 702 if it assists the trier of
fact in understanding a little-known psychological problem.4 7 Relevance
and admissibility of expert testimony was the primary focus of State v.
Janes,48 where the Supreme Court of Washington reversed a trial court
decision to exclude evidence of Battered Child Syndrome in the context
of a self-defense claim to a murder charge.4 9 The supreme court deemed
the evidence relevant and helpful to the jury under ER 702, even though
it acknowledged that the psychiatric community had not formally
recognized the syndrome.5" The court concluded that "[e]xpert testimony
regarding the syndrome helps the jury to understand the reasonableness
of the defendant's perceptions."'
2.

Due ProcessRamificationsRefusing to Admit Evidence

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Washington
have recognized that a court's refusal to admit certain evidence may
violate defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to secure witnesses on their
own behalf.52 Washington v. Texas53 made this Sixth Amendment right
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

45. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 70, 984 P.2d at 1027 (citing State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220,
232, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993)).
46. See State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351,364, 869 P.2d 43, 50 (1994).
47. See State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 232, 236, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (1993) (deciding that expert

testimony about Battered Child Syndrome was admissible).
48. See id
49. See id. Battered Child Syndrome is used to describe the psychological and physiological
effects of prolonged patterns of abuse. See id at 233, 850 P.2d at 501 (citing Steven R. Hicks,
Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the BatteredChild, 11 L. & Psychol. Rev.

103, 104 (1987)).
50. See id at 233 n.5, 850 P.2d at 501 n.5.
51. Id at 236, 850 P.2d at 503 (citing Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility ofExpert Testimony on the
Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 L. & Psychol. Rev. 103, 104 (1987)).

52. The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.. to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor...

."

U.S. Coast. amend. VI.

53. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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Amendment. 4 In Rock v. Arkansas,55 the Court overruled a state-court
decision that excluded all post-hypnosis testimony." In its decision
concluding that the state court's suppression of the testimony was
unconstitutional,57 the Court reasoned that the interests of justice were
better served by allowing a hypnotized witness to testify and leaving the
jury to decide the weight of that testimony. 8
Although state courts are limited by the Sixth Amendment, they still
retain some power to restrict evidence. The Court has acknowledged that
the right to present witnesses may be limited by "rules of procedure and
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence." 9 However, restrictions on the
right to introduce evidence may not be "arbitrary or disproportionate to
the purposes they are designed to serve."' For mental illnesses other
than DID, the Supreme Court of Washington has recognized that failure
to admit expert testimony relating to a diminished-capacity defense may
deprive defendants of their constitutional right to present evidence in
their own defense.6"
C.

Insanity and Diminished-CapacityDefenses in Washington

Defendants with mental disorders often seek to admit scientific
evidence and expert testimony when they raise insanity or diminishedcapacity defenses.62 Courts conduct separate legal analyses of insanity
and diminished capacity because each represents a distinct theory and
defense.63

54. See id. at 17-19, cited with approval in State v. Smith, 101 Wash. 2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100,
103 (1984).
55. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
56. See id. at 62; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (overruling state
court's exclusion of hearsay when hearsay was corroborated and had other indications of reliability).
57. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 62.
58. See id. at 54.
59. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
60. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55-56.
61. See State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 523, 963 P.2d 843, 856 (1998).
62. See, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 618 (Haw. 1984) (seeking to admit evidence of
MPD); State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 84, 960 P.2d 980, 982 (1998), rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 64,
984 P.2d 1024 (1999) (DID); State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash. App. 326, 334, 617 P.2d 1041, 1046
(1980) (paranoid schizophrenia).
63. See State v. Jamison, 94 Wash. 2d 663, 665-66, 619 P.2d 352, 353 (1980).

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
1.

Insanity Defense

To meet the statutory requirements for an insanity defense, defendants
must show that due to a mental disease or defect, they were unable to
appreciate the nature and quality of their actions or unable to distinguish
right from wrong.' Insanity provides a defense in Washington not
because it establishes innocence, "but because the state declines to
convict or punish one shown to have committed the crime while mentally
impaired."65 The defendant bears the burden of proving insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence.' In insanity defense cases not involving
DID, Washington courts regularly admit expert testimony to describe
psychological disorders.67 Washington courts have even admitted expert
testimony where it provides only a "mere scintilla of evidence" to
support insanity."
2.

Diminished-CapacityDefense

Diminished capacity is the legal term used to describe a mental
condition that prevents a defendant from possessing the specific mental
state required by law.69 For example, in State v. Griffin" the court held
that the jury should have received a diminished-capacity instruction after
an expert testified that the defendant suffered from catatonic paranoid
schizophrenia and alcoholism and was incapable of forming an intent to
defraud. 1 Expert testimony about depression, lack of sleep, anxiety,
alcohol use, and personality disorder has also been considered relevant
and admissible. 2 Before a judge will instruct a jury about diminished
64. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.12.010 (1998). Washington's insanity defense uses the same
criteria as the famous English insanity case Regina v. M'Naughten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (H.L.
1843).
65. State v. Box, 109 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 745 P.2d 23, 29 (1987) (citing Gilerist v. Kincheloe,
589 F. Supp. 291,294 (E.D. Wash. 1984), afid,774 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1985)).
66. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.12.010(2) (1998).
67. See, e.g., State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 564, 578-79, 374 P.2d 942, 950, 958-59 (1962);
Crenshaw,27 Wash. App. at 333, 617 P.2d at 1046.
68. Jamison, 94 Wash. 2d at 665, 619 P.2d at 353 (deciding expert testimony admitted into
evidence insufficient to require jury instruction for insanity).
69. See State v. Warden, 133 Wash. 2d 559, 564, 947 P.2d 708, 711 (1997).
70. 100 Wash. 2d 417, 670 P.2d 265 (1983).
71. See id at 418-19,670 P.2d at 266.
72. See, e.g., State v. Eakins, 127 Wash. 2d 490, 493, 902 P.2d 1236, 1239 (1995) (regarding
alcohol and drug use); Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d at 419, 670 P.2d at 266 (regarding alcohol and

919
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capacity, a defendant must produce "substantial evidence" of the mental
condition and connect the alleged mental condition to the inability to
possess the requisite level of culpability." The burden is on the State to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the mental state
required to commit the crime charged.74
The Supreme Court of Washington recently held in State v. Ellis75 that
ER 702 should be used to determine the admissibility of expert testimony
in diminished-capacity cases.76 The court reversed the trial court's77
decision to exclude expert testimony related to diminished capacity.
Defendant Ellis was tried for aggravated first-degree murder and faced
capital punishment. 78 To support his diminished-capacity defense, Ellis
presented two experts prepared to testify that he suffered from a variety
of mental conditions, including dissociative disorder,79 intermittent
explosive disorder, and antisocial personality disorder.8" The state's
expert agreed that Ellis suffered from a personality disorder, but
questioned its severity and relationship to diminished capacity."1 While
concluding that the trial court unreasonably excluded the expert
testimony, 2 the supreme court emphasized that using factors to

schizophrenia); State v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 100-01, 621 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1981)
(combining lack of sleep, alcohol, and mental disorders).
73. Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d at 418-19, 670 P.2d at 266. Washington has classified four levels of
culpability: intent, knowledge, recklessness, or criminal negligence. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 9A.08.010 (1998). See infra note 130 for the culpability requirements of the charges in State v.
Greene.
74. See State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 106, 960 P.2d 980, 993 (1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
75. 136 Wash. 2d 498,963 P.2d 843 (1998).
76. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 521, 963 P.2d at 855. Before Ellis, courts analyzed admissibility of
expert testimony in diminished capacity cases using a nine-factor test established in State v. Edmon.
See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 73 n.3, 984 P.2d at 1029 n.3. The factors of the Edmon test focused on
the expert's qualifications and whether the expert's opinion would show that the alleged mental
condition caused an inability to form intent. See Edmon, 28 Wash. App. at 102-03, 621 P.2d at
1313.
77. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 499, 963 P.2d at 844.
78. See id.
79. See supra note 16 (explaining that dissociative disorder is in same general diagnostic category
as DID).
80. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 508-13, 963 P.2d at 848-5 1. These disorders are classified in the
DSM-IV, supra note 2, at 477, 612, and 649-50, respectively.
81. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 509, 516, 963 P.2d at 849, 852-53.
82. See id. at 523, 963 P.2d at 856.

920
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determine admissibility beyond those contained in ER 70283 deprived the
defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to present evidence on his own
behalf.8
D.

Use ofExpert Testimony RegardingDID in Washington and Other
Jurisdictions

and other jurisdictions86 have already
Courts in Washington
addressed how expert testimony about DID should be used in criminal
trials and have admitted such testimony. Many courts have developed
specialized legal standards for assessing the culpability of a defendant
with DID.8 7 The three most prominent legal standards used by courts in
the assessment of a DID defendant's state of mind are the alter, host, and
unified approaches.88 Courts have admitted expert testimony using all
three approaches.8 9
1.

Courts Face Challengesin DevelopingSpecializedLegal Standards
to Assess the CriminalCulpabilityofDefendants with DID

In formulating specialized legal standards regarding when and how a
criminal defendant with DID can be found guilty of a crime," the
primary challenge courts face is how to treat each of the many alter
personalities. For example, if a defendant with DID raises a diminishedcapacity defense, courts must choose which personality or personalities
to examine when determining the defendant's mental state at the time of
the alleged crime. The legal standard courts select to assess the mental
state of a defendant with DID is intertwined with issues regarding

83. ER 702 mandates that the evidence assist the trier of fact. See Wash. R. Evid. 702; supranote
14.
84. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 523, 963 P.2d at 856.

85. See State v. Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d 347, 349, 850 P.2d 507, 508 (1993); State v. Jones, 82
Wash. App. 871, 871-73,920 P.2d 225,225-26 (1996).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1018 (10th Cir. 1993); Kirby v. State,
410 S.E.2d 333, 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 617 (Haw. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Roman, 606 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Mass. 1993).
87. See, e.g., Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1012-13; Rodrigues, 679 P.2d at 617-19; Roman, 606
N.E.2d at 1336.

88. See Owens, supranote 8, at 247-57.
89. See ied
90. See id.
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whether these defendants should be punished. 9' The key question for
purposes of punishment is whether courts should view "persons as
constituted by their memories and other psychological characteristics" or
by their physical bodies.92 If criminal responsibility focuses on the
physical body, multiples should arguably be punished for crimes
committed by just one of their alters. 93 One commentator suggests that
punishing the entire body for the acts of a single alter is analogous to
punishing Siamese twins for the acts of one twin.94 On the other hand, if
criminal responsibility and punishment focus only on the mind or a part
thereof, courts must decide what part or parts of the mind are most
relevant. Although the Supreme Court of Washington has declined to
adopt a legal standard for defendants with DID, it has acknowledged that
such a standard is necessary. 95
2.

CourtsHave Used Three Different Legal Standards to Assess
CriminalResponsibility of Defendants With DID

Courts have used three basic approaches to determine if a defendant
with DID should be held responsible for a crime. The alter approach,
which bases criminal culpability on the state of mind of the alter in
control at the time of the crime,96 is the most frequently used97 and has
been used by Washington trial courts. 9 Although the Supreme Court of
Washington has not explicitly adopted a specific approach, it has
affirmed a decision that used the alter approach. 9 The host approach
91. See Saks, supra note 10, at 385-86. For a review of various theories of punishment, see Marc
Miller and Martin Guggenheim, PretrialDetention and Punishment,75 Minn. L. Rev. 335 (1990).
92. Saks, supra note 10, at 410-11.
93. Seeid. at411-14.
94. Seeid. at 414-15.
95. See State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 77, 984 P.2d 1024, 1031 (1999) ("In our view, the
helpfulness of the proffered expert testimony can be determined only in relation to a legal standard
for culpability in the context of DID.").
96. See Owens, supranote 8, at 247.
97. See id.; see, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 619-20 (Haw. 1984) (noting that trial
court admitted testimony of five experts, resulting in acquittal by reason of insanity);
Commonwealth v. Roman, 606 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Mass. 1993) (noting that testifying expert
believed defendant had MPD but was able to conform behavior to law).
98. See State v. Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d 347, 351, 850 P.2d 507, 509 (1993); State v. Jones, 82
Wash. App. 871, 871-74, 920 P.2d 225, 225-26 (1996).
99. See Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d at 357, 850 P.2d at 512. The Wheaton court stated that it did not
have sufficient information to establish a legal standard applicable to all future DID cases but
nevertheless upheld the trial court's decision to convict Wheaton using the alter approach. Id.

922
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bases culpability on the host personality's awareness of the alleged
criminal actions taken by alter personalities and the host's ability to
control the alters."° Finally, the unified approach makes no legal
distinctions between hosts or alters.' ° '
a.

The Alter Approach

The alter approach follows the common law mens rea fiamework,
which looks to the mental state of the alter in control at the time of the
alleged criminal act.' °2 Courts reason that criminal accountability is
justified if the alter in control at the time of the crime possessed the
mental state necessary to commit the crime.0 3 Courts do not consider the
mental state of the host when using the alter approach."°
In State v. Wheaton,"°5 a Washington trial court used the alter
approach and the supreme court affirmed. The trial court admitted expert
testimony about MPD and ruled in a bench trial on stipulated facts" 6 that
the defendant was guilty because the alter in control at the time of the
alleged crime was legally sane.'0 7 The Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the trial court's guilty verdict but stated that it was not
establishing a legal standard for determining the culpability of a
defendant with MPD.' The court acknowledged that developing a legal
standard to assess the criminal culpability of a defendant with MPD was
a legal decision, but decided that it did not have sufficient scientific
information to develop such a standard. 9 The court criticized an expert
witness for testifying about approaches courts could use to determine the
sanity of a defendant with MPD because such testimony encroached on
the courts' responsibility to decide legal matters including criminal

100. See Owens, supra note 8, at 255.
101. See id. at 252-53.
102. See id. at 247.
103. See, e.g., Kirkland v. State, 304 S.E.2d 561,564 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).

104. See id.; see also United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1018 (10lth Cir. 1993).
105. 121 Wash. 2d 347, 850 P.2d 507 (1993).
106. See id. at 349-51, 850 P.2d at 508-09. Other jurisdictions using the alter approach have
admitted expert testimony about DID. See, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 619-20 (Haw.
1984); Commonwealth v. Roman, 606 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Mass. 1993).

107. See Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d at 351,850 P.2d at 509.
108. See id.at 357, 850 P.2d at 512.
109. See id.at 356, 850 P.2d at 512.
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responsibility and sanity."' Although the court's stated reasons for
affirming the trial court's decision were lack of evidence and inadequate
legal authority,"' the result of the court's decision was affirmation of a
guilty verdict based on the alter approach." 2
b.

The Host Approach

Although not used thus far in Washington, other jurisdictions have
admitted expert testimony about DID using the host approach, which
requires a court to consider only the mental state of the host
personality.' '3 In United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 14 the Tenth Circuit
used the host approach to reverse a kidnapping conviction obtained using
the alter approach." 5 The court concluded that the federal insanity statute
did not prevent defendants from arguing and submitting expert testimony
that the host was insane even if the alter in control at the time of the
crime was not." 6 The court emphasized the maxim that penal statutes,
including those related to criminal defenses, should be construed strictly
against the state.'' The court concluded that because the insanity defense
was meant to protect defendants with mental disorders, it should not be
denied to defendants with DID who claim their hosts were insane." 8
c.

The UnifiedApproach

To date, three jurisdictions have adopted the unified approach, which
holds the entire body responsible for the actions of any single
110. See id. at 353-54, 850 P.2d at 510 (criticizing expert witness who suggested either host or
alter approach).
11. See id at 356-57, 850 P.2d at 512.
112. After Wheaton, the court of appeals in State v. Jones admitted expert testimony about MPD
in relation to a diminished-capacity defense where the court adopted the alter approach as its legal
standard. State v. Jones, 82 Wash. App. 871, 871-73, 920 P.2d 225, 225-26 (1996). The court
upheld the defendant's conviction because although evidence indicated the host was not aware of or
able to control the alter personalities, the alter in control at the time knowingly committed indecent
liberties. See id.
113. See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1016 (10th Cir. 1993).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1012-13.
116. See id. at 1013-14 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)).
117. See Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1014 (citing Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831
(1974)).
118. See id. at 1014-15.

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
personality.' 19 Courts have used this approach primarily in a procedural
sense to defeat defendants' claims that their DID prevented them from
assisting counsel 2 ' or that they were denied their right to testify because
all alters did not get the opportunity to testify.' For example, in State v.
Halcomb' the defendant argued that statements about the crime given

voluntarily by one alter personality should not be admissible against the
host personality." The court decided that statements provided
voluntarily by any of the defendant's various alters were admissible
against the entire body. 24
Regardless of whether an alter, host, or unified approach is used,
numerous courts in Washington and throughout the country have

admitted expert testimony about DID."z Washington courts admitted
expert testimony about DID'26 until the supreme court's decision in State
v. Greene.27

II.

STATE v. GREENE

State v. Greene is the most recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington addressing DID. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed
28
the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the defendant's DID.
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that DID was

generally accepted in the scientific community but upheld the trial
court's decision to exclude the evidence. 29

119. See Owens, supra note 7, at 253-54 (citing State v. Halcomb, 510 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1993); State v. Badger, 551 A.2d 207, 209 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); State v.
Woodard, 404 S.E.2d 6, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)).
120. See State v. Badger, 551 A.2d 207, 209 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
121. See State v. Woodard, 404 S.E.2d 6, 10 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
122. 510 N.W.2d 344 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
123. See&L at351.
124. See id.
125. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
126. See infra note 128 and accompanying text
127. 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
128. State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 107, 960 P.2d 980, 994 (1998), rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 64,
984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
129. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 66-67,984 P.2d at 1025.
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Facts
Defendant William Greene was charged with indecent liberties and

kidnapping 3 ' for fondling then tying up his therapist, who came to his
apartment because she believed he was at risk of committing suicide.'
Greene claimed insanity and diminished capacity.3 2 He was prepared to
present evidence including expert testimony that other alters were in
control during the incident and that those alters were either legally insane
or unable to form the requisite intent.'
Greene had a long history of abuse, mental illness, and
imprisonment.'3 4 He suffered severe physical, sexual, and emotional
abuse as a child, including a gang rape by three older boys when he was
twelve. 3 After a 1972 conviction for motor vehicle theft,'36 Greene
spent most of his time in prison, accumulating convictions for sodomy,
attempted burglary, and indecent liberties."' After his release in 1992,
Greene continued to receive treatment, was gainfully employed, and
38
maintained a non-abusive, intimate relationship.
Therapists first diagnosed Greene with DID while he was
participating in a sex-offender treatment program. 139 A total of twentyfour alters were identified with different age, race, and gender
characteristics. 40 For example, Tyrone originally manifested "as an
130. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 90, 960 P.2d at 985. The crime of indecent liberties is
committed when a defendant knowingly has sexual contact with another person by forcible
compulsion. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.100(l)(a) (1998). A person commits kidnapping in the
first degree by intentionally abducting another person to facilitate commission of any felony or
flight thereafter. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.40.020(1)(b) (1998).
131. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 89-94, 960 P.2d at 985-87.
132. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 67-68, 984 P.2d at 1026.
133. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 94, 960 P.2d at 987. The therapist/victim gave an offer of
proof where she testified that Tyrone, Sam and Auto/Otto were intermittently present. See id. She
believed Tyrone had regressed to three or four years old at the time of the incident. See id.A police
detective who questioned the defendant testified outside the presence of the jury that he identified
three specific alters during questioning the day after the incident. See id.Dr. Robert Olsen was
prepared to give expert testimony about the defendant's DID to support a diminished-capacity
defense. See id. at 106, 960 P.2d at 993-94.
134. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 88-89, 960 P.2d at 984-85.
135. See id. at 88, 960 P.2d at 984-85.
136. See id. at 89, 960 P.2d at 985.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
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adult, black male who used 'rough and assaultive' language," but began
regressing in age as Greene addressed his childhood abuse issues. 4 ' Sam
was also initially violent, but vowed not to harm others after addressing
abuse issues in therapy.'42 Auto/Otto had a generally flat affect and no
aggressive tendencies.'43
B.

Trial Court and CourtofAppeals Decisions

During a pre-trial hearing, the trial court excluded all evidence
relating to DID.'" In a ruling that merged the Frye analysis with ER 702
considerations,' 45 the court determined that DID was not generally
accepted in the scientific community, was not relevant to the insanity
defense,'46 and would not be helpful to the trier of fact. 4 7 The court
permitted the therapist/victim to testify at trial, but she could not mention
48
DID.
Applying Washington's two-part test for determining the admissibility
of expert testimony,"' the court of appeals reversed the judgment and
remanded to the trial court for consideration of expert testimony about
DID relating to both the insanity and diminished-capacity defenses. 50
First, the court determined that, as a matter of law, DID was generally
accepted by the scientific community and therefore passed the Frye
test.' The court based its decision on the inclusion of DID in the
American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual'52 and
acknowledgment by both state and defense experts that DID is generally
141. Id.

142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 91,960 P.2d at 986.
145. See id. at 96-97, 960 P.2d at 988-89; State v. Greene, 139 Wash.2d 64, 70-71, 984 P.2d
1024, 1027 (1999).
146. The court did not make a specific ruling about DID's relation to a diminished-capacity
defense, but ruled to exclude DID evidence in relation to diminished capacity following a motion by
the state. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 91,960 P.2d at 986.

147. See id
148. See id at 107, 960 P.2d at 994. She complained during direct examination by the State that
she felt unable "to say an awful lot of things that need to be said." Id. at 107 n.32, 960 P.2d at 994
n.32.
149. See id at 95, 960 P.2d at 988.
150. See id at 113, 960 P.2d at 997-98.
151. See id at 100, 960 P.2d at 990.

152. See id. at 97-98, 960 P.2d at 989.
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accepted.' 53 Second, because DID manifests itself differently in each
individual, the court adopted a case-by-case approach to determine if
DID was relevant to the specific defenses asserted.'54
The court of appeals considered expert testimony about DID relevant
because the evidence would help the trier of fact determine whether the
defendant was legally insane or had diminished capacity.' The court
found the expert testimony about DID relevant to Greene's insanity
defense because the evidence tended to show that at the time of the
alleged crime Greene was unable to perceive the nature of his actions or
distinguish right from wrong.'56 "Arguably, his host and adult alters were
unconscious and his emergent alter had the mental capacity of a young
child."' 57 The court also decided that expert testimony about DID was
relevant to diminished capacity'58 because the evidence tended to show
that, based on his DID, Greene was either in a child-like state or unable
to control his behavior.'59 The court reasoned that "[t]o hold otherwise
would be manifestly unfair in light of the legislative pronouncement that
even voluntary intoxication may be considered in assessing the
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime."' 16
C.

Supreme Court of Washington Excludes Expert Testimony About
DID

The Supreme Court of Washington applied the same two-part test
used by the court of appeals, but held the DID evidence inadmissible.
Using the Frye test, the supreme court deemed DID a generally accepted,
diaguosable, psychiatric condition. 62 However, the court concluded that
the evidence of DID was not admissible because it would not be helpful
to the trier of fact under ER 702.163

153.
154.
155.
156.

See id.
See id. at 102, 960 P.2d at 991.
See id. at 107, 960 P.2d at 994.
See id. at 105, 960 P.2d at 993.

157. Id. at 103, 960 P.2d at 992.
158. See id. at 107, 960 P.2d at 994.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 73, 984 P.2d 1024, 1028-29 (1999).
162. See id. at 72, 984 P.2d at 1028.
163. See id. at 66-67, 984 P.2d at 1025.
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The court reasoned that expert testimony about DID would not be
admissible until a legal standard is developed to allow reliable
assessment of the criminal culpability of defendants with DID. 6 The
court stated that as a precondition to admissibility of expert testimony
regarding DID under ER 702, the question of whether and how a person
with DID should be held accountable for crimes allegedly committed by
an alter personality must first be answered. 6 5 Before the jury could
decide Greene's mental state at the time of the crime, the court believed
the jury needed to be told which of Greene's many personalities should
be evaluated. "6
The court refused to adopt a particular legal standard 67 for assessing
the criminal responsibility of a defendant with DID.'68 Although the
court acknowledged that the question of who should be held responsible
for a crime is ultimately a legal decision,'69 it claimed to need more
information from the scientific community "in understanding how DID
affects individuals suffering from it and how this may be related to a
determination of legal culpability."' 7° Because the court found it
impossible to connect reliably the symptoms of DID to a defendant's
sanity or mental capacity, it affirmed the trial court's ruling excluding
7
the evidence.1 '
1II.

THE GREENE COURT SHOULD HAVE ADMITTED EXPERT
TESTIMONY ABOUT DID

The Supreme Court of Washington should have decided that the
expert testimony that Greene offered about DID was admissible. First,
the court improperly failed to establish a standard to determine the
culpability of a defendant with DID. Second, even without a specific
164. See id.at 78-79, 984 P.2d at 1031.

165. See id
166. See id.
167. See supraPart LD.2
168. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 78-79, 984 P.2d at 1031.
169. See ia at 78, 984 P.2d at 1031.
170. Id In both Greene and Wheaton, the supreme court relied on the opinion of the state's expert
Dr. Robert Gagliardi. In both cases, the defense experts testified that it is possible to make
determinations of sanity for defendants with DID. See id, 139 Wash. 2d at 75, 984 P.2d at 1030
(noting that expert was willing to testify
to sanity of specific alters); State v. Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d
347, 353-54, 850 P.2d 507, 510 (1993).
171. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 79, 984 P.2d at 1032.
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legal standard, the court should have admitted the expert testimony about
DID. Such testimony would have been helpful to the jury under ER 702
to evaluate the defendant's sanity and mental capacity. Third, the court
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present evidence on
his own behalf.
A.

Sufficient Scientific Evidence Already Existed Forthe Greene
Court to Establish and Apply a Legal Standardto Determine the
Culpabilityof a Defendant with DID

The Greene court failed to recognize that the existing information
about DID, which the court acknowledged was a generally accepted
disorder in the scientific community, 72 was sufficient for the court to
create a legal standard to assess the culpability of defendants with DID.
Other courts have concluded that the scientific community has already
produced sufficient evidence for those courts to establish legal standards
regarding the criminal culpability of defendants with DID.'73 Other
jurisdictions have also repeatedly recognized the ability of experts,
courts, and triers of fact to apply DID evidence. 74 Even the Supreme
Court of Washington in Wheaton allowed experts to testify about the
ability of a multiple to perceive the nature of her actions, the
personalities' knowledge of right from wrong, and what knowledge the
host had of the alters' activities.'7 5
The Greene court claimed it needed scientific information identifying
the "controlling and/or knowledgeable alters at the time of the crime"
before it could determine which of Greene's personalities should be held
responsible for the crime or establish a legal standard applicable to future
DID cases.' 76 However, the witnesses in Greene actually provided this
information. Defense expert Dr. Olsen was prepared to testify about the

172. See id. at 72-73, 984 P.2d at 1028.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1008 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993); State v.
Kirkland, 304 S.E.2d 561, 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 620-21 (Haw.
1984).
174. See, e.g., Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1006-10; Kirkland, 304 S.E.2d at 565; Rodrigues, 679
P.2d at 620-21.
175. See State v. Wheaton, 121 Wash. 2d 347, 351, 365, 850 P.2d 507, 509, 516 (1993); see also
supra Part I.D.2.a.
176. See Greene, 121 Wash. 2d. at 78, 984 P.2d at 1031.
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mental condition of the alter in control and the host personality.'
Greene's therapist/victim was prepared to testify about which alters
participated in the crime, the characteristics of the alters, and the amnesia
that exists between alter and host personalities.'
Additional scientific study is unlikely to provide more definitive
answers about which personality should be considered for purposes of
determining criminal culpability. Even Dr. Gagliardi, whom the court
relied upon in reaching its conclusion that DID is incapable of reliable
application to determine sanity or diminished capacity,'7 9 said that
mental-health researchers have little or no reason to study the
relationship between DID and legal concepts such as sanity or
diminished capacity:
I don't know that anybody's done a study that investigates... in an
empirical or scientific way how a disorder like DID affects sanity.
And there's good reason for that, because sanity is, after all, a legal
question .... It's like mixing apples and oranges. They're two very
different sets of concepts and ideas.8
If the court in Greene had established a legal standard, the evidence
available would have been sufficient to allow the jury to make a decision
about sanity and diminished capacity. For example, if the court decided
that the mental-state inquiry should focus on the alter in charge,' Dr.
Olsen and the therapist/victim could have testified about the four-yearold boy's personality, his understanding of right from wrong, and the
ability of any other alters or the host to control his behavior. Similar to
other trials focusing on mental state,' the state's expert could have
presented testimony asserting that Tyrone did know right from wrong or
that another alter was able to control Tyrone's behavior. Similarly, if the
court selected the host approach,' Dr. Olsen and the therapist/victim
could have testified about whether the host was unconscious during the
alleged crime and whether he had any ability to stop Tyrone. After
receiving instruction regarding which personality or personalities to
177.
(1998),
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id. at 75, 984 P.2d at 1030; State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 106, 960 P.2d 980, 994
rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 64,984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 103-04, 960 P.2d at 992.
See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 76,984 P.2d at 1030.
Greene, 92 Wash. App at 97, 960 P.2d at 989.
See supra Part LD.2.a.
See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 509, 516, 963 P.2d 843, 849, 852 (1998).
See supra Part LD.2.b.
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focus on, the jury could have applied the statutory requirements for
insanity'" and indecent liberties'85 to determine if Greene was guilty.
In sum, the scientific community has already provided courts with the
building blocks necessary' 6 to establish standards for determining sanity
or mental capacity of defendants with DID. All that is missing in
Washington is for the court either to establish a new legal standard or
adopt one of the three standards used by courts in other jurisdictions and
previous Washington cases.' 87 Had the court enunciated or adopted such
a standard in Greene, there was sufficient evidence about Greene's
mental condition for expert witnesses to testify and jurors to apply the
information to determine his ultimate criminal responsibility.'
Expert Testimony About DID Should Have Been Admissible
Because It Is Analogous to Testimony Admitted in Previous
Washington Cases

B.

Even without establishing a specific legal standard to determine the
culpability of a defendant with DID, the Greene court should have
admitted the expert testimony for two reasons. First, the court has
previously admitted evidence of a mental condition when it would help
the jury appreciate the difference between a defendant with that
condition and one without. Second, Washington courts have admitted
expert testimony in previous cases when it is relevant to the specific
defenses raised.
1.

Expert Testimony About DID Should Have Been Admitted Because
It Would Have Been Helpful to the Trier of Fact

The court should have found expert testimony about DID helpful to
the trier of fact as required by ER 702 because it would have illustrated
the differences between a defendant with a mental disorder and one
184. See generally supraPart I.D.
185. See supranote 130 and accompanying text.
186. See supraPart I.D.
187. See supraPart I.D.
188. See State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 75-79, 984 P.2d 1024, 1029-31 (1999). Evidence
indicated that the host personality was not in control or conscious of the actions of the other alters.
See State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 103, 960 P.2d 980, 992 (1998), rev'd, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 984
P.2d 1024 (1999). Evidence also indicated that the alter in control had the mental capacity of a small
child. See id.
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without. In analogous precedent, the court has found expert testimony
about a defendant's mental condition helpful to the trier of fact 89 and
therefore admissible.' 9 For example, the court in State v. Janes9'
decided that expert testimony regarding Battered Child Syndrome was
helpful as required by ER 702 and should be admitted 9 2 to support the
defendant's diminished capacity and self-defense claims. 93 The court
decided that because "[w]ithout the aid of expert testimony on the
psychology of battered children, the jury will be unable to appreciate the
manner in which the abused child differs from the unabused child."' 94

Similar to Janes, experts were prepared to testify that Greene's actions
might have been different from a person without DID because control of
his body switched between alters.'" The trial court permitted witnesses
to testify about Greene's frequent change of voice, behavior, and

mannerisms but prohibited the witnesses from explaining those actions in
the context of DID.'96 Even the therapist/victim complained that she was
unable to explain fully the actions that led to Greene's criminal charges
without mentioning DID 97 By refusing to allow evidence of DID and
the expert testimony necessary to understand fully that evidence, the

court prevented the jury from hearing relevant information about the
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime.'98 Without knowing that
the defendant suffered from DID and how that disorder may have

189. See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 522, 963 P.2d 843, 855-56 (1998); State v. Janes,
121 Wash. 2d 220, 236, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (1993); State v. Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d 417, 419, 670
P.2d 265, 266 (1983).
190. See Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 236, 850 P.2d at 503 (citing Steven 1L Hicks, Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on the Psychology ofthe BatteredChild, I1 L. & Psychol. Rev. 103, 104 (1987)).
191. 121 Wash. 2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993). See supranotes 47-51 and accompanying text.
192. See Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 236, 850 P.2d at 503. The court determined that Battered Child

Syndrome was not a recognized psychiatric disease. See id. at 233 n.5, 850 P.2d at 501-02 n.5.
193. See id at 226, 850 P.2d at 498.
194. Id at 236, 850 P.2d at 503.
195. See State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 103-04, 960 P.2d 980, 992 (1998), rev'd, 139 Wash.
2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999) (explaining that emergent personality was small child and at least one
alter tried to stop attack but could not maintain control of body).
196. See id. at 104-05, 960 P.2d at 992-93.
197. See id. at 107 n.32, 960 P.2d at 994, n.32.
198. See U (citing Lee v. Thompson, 452 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Tenn. 1977)) ("[T'he words
and acts of a defendant immediately before, during and after the offense are the best evidence of his
state of mind at the time of the acts charged.").

Washington Law Review

Vol. 75:911, 2000

affected him, the jury was likely confused about what happened in
Greene's apartment. '9
2.

Expert Testimony About DID Should Have Been Admitted Because
It Was Relevant to the Specific Defenses Claimed

The court should have conducted an explicit analysis of Greene's
defenses as it had done in previous cases 0 0 and concluded that expert
testimony about DID was relevant to the specific defenses claimed and
therefore helpful to the trier of fact as required by ER 702. Expert
testimony about a defendant's mental condition is admissible when
relevant to the questions of sanity or mental state. 20 1 Because expert
testimony about DID was relevant to Greene's insanity and diminishedcapacity defenses and therefore admissible, the supreme court erred in
22
reversing the decision of the court of appeals.
a.

The Court Should Have Determined That Expert Testimony About
DID Was Helpful UnderER 702 to Evaluate the Insanity Defense

The Greene court should have ruled that expert testimony about DID
was admissible under ER 702 because such evidence would have helped
the jury determine whether Greene met the requirements for the insanity
defense. The supreme court acknowledged in Greene that the key
question to determine if expert testimony about DID would be helpful, as
envisioned by ER 702, was whether "Greene's mental condition
prevented him from seeing the nature, quality, or wrongfulness of his
actions. '
Expert testimony about DID was relevant to Greene's insanity defense
because DID is a mental disorder that arguably made Greene unable to
perceive the nature of his actions or appreciate the wrongfulness of those
199. See id. at 91-95, 960 P.2d at 985-88.
200. See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 521-22, 963 P.2d 843, 855-56 (1998); State v.
Jamison, 94 Wash. 2d 663, 664-65, 619 P.2d 352, 352-53 (1980).
201. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 521-23, 963 P.2d at 855-56; State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash. App.
326, 333, 617 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1980).
202. The court of appeals conducted a separate analysis of each defense and concluded that the
expert testimony about DID was relevant and therefore admissible in support of either an insanity or
diminished-capacity defense. See Greene, 92 Wash. App at 102-07, 960 P.2d at 991-94.
203. State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 73, 984 P.2d 1024, 1029 (1999) (citing State v. Box, 109
Wash. 2d 320, 745 P.2d 23 (1987)).
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actions. Because the court has recognized DID as a generally accepted,
diagnosable, mental disorder,' 4 DID evidence is relevant to the statutory
insanity-defense requirement that the defendant have a mental disease or
defect." 5 Greene's DID was also relevant to the insanity-defense
requirement that he be unable to perceive the nature of his actions or
distinguish between right and wrong.20° At the time of the actions
charged, Greene's four-year-old alter Tyrone was in control of the body
while the host and adult alters lay unconscious. 2 7 Arguably, the
defendant's child alter did not know it was wrong to fondle the therapist
and the other personalities did not perceive the behavior because they
were unconscious. 0 8 In short, expert testimony about DID was relevant
for the jury to understand how and to what extent DID may have affected
Greene's actions and sanity and therefore should have been admitted as
helpful under ER 702.
The policy behind the insanity statute, that criminal responsibility and
punishment should not be assigned to an actor who, at the time of the
alleged crime, was unable to know what was being done or that it was
wrong,209 also supports admission of DID evidence. Denying the insanity
defense to defendants with diagnosable, legally recognized mental
illnesses such as DID is inconsistent with that policy goal. 0 Thus, the
court should have held that the expert testimony about DID was relevant
to the insanity defense and therefore admissible under ER 702 because
the evidence relates directly to the statutory criteria for establishing an
insanity defense and is supported by the policy interests of the insanity
statute.

204. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 72, 984 P.2d at 1028.
205. See United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993). The federal insanitydefense statute is nearly identical to the Washington statute. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), with
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.12.010 (1998).

206. See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
207. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 103- 04, 960 P.2d at 992.

208. See &L
209. See State v. Box, 109 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 745 P.2d 23, 28-29 (1987); see also DennyShaffer, 2 F.3d at 1012 (interpreting nearly identical federal insanity statute).
210. See Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d at 1014; see also State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash. App. 326,341, 617
P.2d 1041, 1050 (1980) (Ringold, J., dissenting) ("We must err in the direction of maintaining
insanity as a viable defense, for it is a much greater injustice to send an insane person to the
penitentiary than to send a criminal to an asylum.").
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The Court Should Have Determined That Expert Testimony
RegardingDID Was Helpful Under ER 702 to Evaluate the
Diminished-CapacityDefense

The Greene court should have admitted expert testimony regarding
DID because it would have helped the jury to determine whether the
defendant had diminished capacity at the time of the alleged crime.
Evidence is relevant2 . to diminished capacity if it "logically and
reasonably connects the defendant's alleged mental condition with the
inability to possess the required level of culpability. 21 2 Greene's disorder
is similar to conditions that courts have previously deemed relevant to
diminished capacity. For example, both Greene and the defendant in
State v. Griffin had periods of memory loss. 213 Experts have also been
permitted to testify about schizophrenia, effects of which include identity
confusion, indecisive thinking, and poor impulse control and are similar
to DID's effect on Greene.214 Greene also had a dissociative disorder
similar to the defendant in State v. Ellis,"5 although Greene's condition
was arguably more serious because, unlike Ellis, Greene was alleged to
have been dissociated from his host personality at the time of the alleged
crime." Ellis was also described by one expert as suffering from a
significant loss of ego control.2" 7 Greene should have been permitted to
introduce evidence of similar lack of ego control caused by the shifting
between personalities and the unconsciousness of his host.
The severity of Greene's DID also supports the admissibility of such
evidence. The Greene court acknowledged that DID creates "debilitating
21 8
ruptures in the patient's personality, behavior, thought, and memory."
In addition, DID is at least as serious as previous mental conditions that
prompted Washington courts to admit expert testimony.2t 9 In State v.
211. Relevant evidence is considered helpful to the jury and admissible under ER 702. See State
v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 364, 869 P.2d 43, 50 (1994).
212. State v. Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d 417,419, 670 P.2d 265, 266 (1983).
213. See Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 94, 103, 960 P.2d at 987, 992; Griffin, 100 Wash. 2d 417,
418, 670 P.2d 265, 266 (1983).
214. See State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 511-12, 963 P.2d 843, 850 (1998) (citing State v.
Thamert, 45 Wash. App. 143, 723 P.2d 1204 (1986)).
215. See id. at 520, 963 P.2d at 854; Greene, 92 Wash. App. at 94, 960 P.2d at 987.
216. See id.
217. See Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 508-09, 963 P.2d at 848-49.
218. State v. Greene, 139 Wash. 2d 64, 69, 984 P.2d 1024, 1026 (1999).
219. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.

Expert Testimony and State v. Green
Edmon,22 the court admitted evidence of lack of sleep, anxiety,
depression, and alcohol use to support a diminished-capacity defense."'
In State v. Ellis, the court deemed admissible expert testimony that the
defendant suffered from impulse control disorder, even though the
diagnosis was founded in part on the expert's belief that "it's not very
common that human beings kill their mothers and little sisters."' m If
experts are permitted to testify that the extraordinary nature of the crime
or lack of sleep is evidence of diminished capacity, Greene's debilitating,
documented mental condition should also qualify as admissible.
C.

Exclusion of Expert Testimony About DID Violates the Compulsory
ProcessClause

The Supreme Court of Washington's decision to exclude evidence of
Greene's DID violated his right to present evidence in his defense as
guaranteed by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment
because the court failed to state an acceptable reason for denying him
this right.' The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that concerns about
fairness, reliability, or lack of corroborating evidence would serve as
legitimate bases for excluding a defendant's witnesses.224 The court in
Greene did not express concern about any of these factors. Instead, the
court acknowledged the reliability of the evidence by concluding that
DID is a generally accepted medical disorder and by assuming that
Greene had the disorder.' A plethora of evidence would have
corroborated the defense expert, including Greene's long history of
mental illness 6 and the testimony of the therapist/victim 2 7 and the
police officer who interviewed Greene." The defendant should not have

220. 28 Wash. App. 98, 621 P.2d 1310 (1981).
221. See Ednon, 28 Wash. App. at 100-02,621 P.2d at 1312-13.
222. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d at 520-21, 963 P.2d at 855.
223. The only reason the court gave for excluding the evidence was lack of a legal standard for

culpability in the context of DID. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 77-78, 984 P.2d at 1031 (1999).
224. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,301-03 (1973). See supra notes 56-59.
225. See Greene, 139 Wash. 2d at 72-73, 76-77 nA,984 P.2d at 1028, 1030 nA.
226. See iL at 89, 960 P.2d at 985.
227. See State v. Greene, 92 Wash. App. 80, 107 n.32, 960 P.2d 980, 994 n.32 (1998), rev'd, 139
Wash. 2d 64, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999).
228. See id. at 94 n.19, 960 P.2d at 987 n.19.
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been denied his constitutional right to present witnesses on his behalf
simply because the court refused to establish a legal standard.229
The court in Greene should have followed its precedent in Ellis, where
it decided it was unconstitutional to exclude testimony of a defense
expert that would have helped the jury better understand the defendant.230
Rather than requiring a formulaic application of the disorder to the facts
to determine culpability, the Ellis court ruled that experts willing to
testify about a defendant's diminished capacity should be allowed to do
so. 231 The Ellis court reasoned that the integrity of the trial process is
sufficiently protected by cross-examination and the ability of the trier of
fact to weigh the evidence. 232 The defense expert in Greene should have
been permitted to testify on similar constitutional grounds because he
was willing to testify to the diminished capacity of the defendant and the
same trial protections would have been present.233
By refusing to establish a legal standard for admitting expert
testimony about DID, the court has created an unconstitutional de facto
rule that DID evidence is per se inadmissible. In declaring
unconstitutional a per se rule refusing to admit post-hypnosis testimony
when that rule prevented a defendant from testifying, the U.S. Supreme
Court concluded that the state court failed to show that the testimony was
"always so untrustworthy and so immune to traditional means of
evaluating credibility" that it should be excluded per se. 234 Greene
established a similarly unconstitutional per se rule by declaring all
testimony about DID inadmissible regardless of credibility or scientific
validity. The Greene court failed to state reasons for excluding the
defendant's expert testimony sufficient to overcome Greene's constitutional interest in presenting witnesses on his own behalf.
IV. CONCLUSION
In State v. Greene, the Supreme Court of Washington explicitly
declined its second opportunity to address the issue of criminal
229. See supra Part I.D.
230. See State v. Ellis, 136 Wash. 2d 498, 522-23, 963 P.2d 843, 855-56 (1998).
231. See id. at 523, 963 P.2d at 856.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 522-23, 963 P.2d at 856.
234. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987); see also supra notes 53-56 and accomp-anying
text.
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culpability for defendants with DID. First, the court failed to recognize
that the scientific community has already provided courts with the
building blocks necessary to establish an appropriate legal standard.
Moreover, while Washington courts are left waiting in vain for a
definitive medical answer, other courts across the country have admitted
DID evidence and made difficult decisions about whether these
defendants should be found culpable and punished. Second, under
Washington precedent, the court should have found expert testimony
about DID helpful to the jury as required by ER 702 because it was
relevant to the specific defenses of insanity and diminished capacity
claimed by Greene. Last, the court's decision violated Greene's right to
present evidence in his defense as guaranteed by the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment by establishing a de facto rule that DID
evidence is per se inadmissible. In the absence of concerns about
fairness, reliability, or lack of corroborating evidence, Greene should not
have been denied his constitutional right simply because the court
refused to establish a standard.
By again refusing to address the criminal responsibility of defendants
with DID, the Supreme Court of Washington has shirked its
responsibility to establish legal standards, ignored scientific evidence,
and violated the constitutional rights of a defendant. Defendants with
DID will continue to be denied a fair trial until the court allows them to
present evidence of what the court acknowledges is a debilitating,
scientifically valid mental disorder.

940

